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Abstract 
A combination of airworthiness and various op-
erational restrictions are currently used to assure that 
unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operations can be 
conducted at an acceptable level of safety. We pre-
sent a methodology to communicate these aspects in 
a unified way, providing a centralized record of safe-
ty risk management (SRM) activities. Central to our 
approach is the notion of structured argument, i.e., an 
explicit chain of reasoning linking safety substantiat-
ing evidence to the overall safety and airworthiness 
objectives. Our use of argumentation is motivated, in 
part, by the observations that: i) certain kinds of UAS 
operations currently require a safety case; ii) struc-
tured arguments are often a core component of mod-
ern safety cases, providing a convenient means to 
represent the underlying reasoning and to access the 
aggregated safety information; and iii) there exists a 
standardized graphical notation to present structured 
arguments, i.e., the goal structuring notation (GSN), 
which has been used in both civil and military avia-
tion. To exemplify our methodology, we apply it to 
an unmanned rotorcraft system (URS), using GSN 
arguments to show the relationship between safety of 
URS operations, and various SRM measures includ-
ing airworthiness, in particular a potential certifica-
tion basis for type design assurance. The example 
illustrates how our approach can coexist with, and 
augment, existing safety processes by transforming 
SRM artifacts into assurance argument fragments. 
Introduction 
Safety assurance of civil unmanned aircraft sys-
tems (UASs), and their associated operations, poses 
challenges distinct from manned aircraft: i) UAS 
types, configurations, capabilities, and operations are 
substantially more diverse; ii) some safety-critical 
functions that were previously solely allocated to air-
borne equipment/crew may now also include an allo-
cation to ground-based equipment/crew, e.g., colli-
sion detection and avoidance; and, iii) airworthiness 
standards, so-called minimum operating performance 
standards (MOPS), and comprehensive regulations 
continue to be under development.  
Presently, there are two avenues by which UAS 
operations are authorized in the US national airspace 
system. Public entities (e.g., government bodies such 
as NASA) must obtain a certificate of waiver or au-
thorization (COA), where airworthiness is self de-
termined against standards acceptable to the civil avi-
ation regulator, i.e., the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA). For private entities, the FAA issues a 
special airworthiness certificate, where either a) the 
existing federal aviation regulations (FARs), which 
apply to manned aircraft, are tailored to a specific 
UAS configuration to establish a restricted category 
airworthiness certification basis, or b) based on the 
UAS configuration, a safety analysis is conducted to 
establish airworthiness in the experimental category, 
or c) an exemption from airworthiness certification is 
granted. Thereafter, depending on the level of air-
worthiness, UAS operations are usually subject to 
additional restrictions, e.g., limitations in altitude, 
range of operations, airspace category, etc. Recently, 
the FAA has proposed a regulatory framework tar-
geted for small UAS1, specifically those weighing up 
to 55 lb. (25 kg.), in which airworthiness certification 
is not required, although there are numerous limita-
tions on configurations, performance, and operations.  
Thus, the trade space for UAS safety can be 
characterized by two extremes: at one end, similar to 
civil aviation, increasing vehicle reliability through 
airworthiness to reduce the likelihood of the system 
failures that may have potentially catastrophic conse-
quences; at the other end, restricting the scope of op-
erations to reduce the likelihood of exposure in the 
presence of system failures. To enable greater flexi-
bility in UAS configurations and operations whilst 
also assuring safety, a combination of measures that 
fall between these two extremes is required.  
An additional FAA requirement for approval of 
certain kinds of UAS operations, e.g., beyond visual 
line-of-sight (BVLOS), is a safety case, i.e., a type of 
safety risk management (SRM) document, to be sup-
plied in a specific format, and outlining at a mini-
mum, the environment of operations, the associated 
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hazards, risks, and risk mitigations [1]. The interna-
tional civil aviation organization (ICAO) defines a 
safety case as “a document which provides substan-
tial evidence that a system to which it pertains meets 
its safety objectives” [2]. In general, a safety case is a 
comprehensive, defensible, and valid justification of 
the safety of a system for a given application in a de-
fined operating environment. Associated with many 
modern safety cases is an additional notion of argu-
ment—i.e., a chain of reasoning connecting the over-
all safety objectives and required substantiating evi-
dence—although, depending on the guidance docu-
ments or standards used, arguments may be either 
implicit [1], [2], or explicitly required [3].  
We submit that a mechanism based on structured 
arguments is useful as a unified means of communi-
cating not only the required elements of a UAS safety 
case, but also aspects of UAS airworthiness and op-
erational safety, serving as a centralized record of  
the results of SRM activities. In this paper, we pre-
sent such a mechanism—exemplified by application 
to an unmanned rotorcraft system (URS)—that trans-
forms the artifacts produced from existing safety 
analysis processes into fragments of assurance argu-
ments. The primary goal is show how structured ar-
guments can communicate airworthiness require-
ments, in particular those relevant for type design 
assurance. An additional goal is to show the relation-
ship between airworthiness and the wider objective of 
(system and operational) safety. The eventual aim is 
to use our approach also to record how the safety and 
airworthiness requirements have been met by a spe-
cific URS design2. 
Our use of argumentation has been motivated by 
a number of observations: first, as mentioned earlier, 
a safety case is required for certain kinds of UAS op-
erations. Second, structured arguments can capture 
the core reasoning underlying a safety case thereby 
explicitly tracing safety considerations from concept 
to requirements to evidence of risk mitigation and 
control [4]. Thus, they provide convenient access to 
the diverse safety information that the safety case 
aggregates. Third, arguments have been shown to 
make it easier to comprehend, and critically review a 
safety case [5]. Finally, to further improve clarity in 
presenting arguments, a relatively well-defined and 
standardized notation exists to graphically present 
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structured arguments, i.e., the goal structuring nota-
tion (GSN), which has been used in both civil and 
military aviation [6]–[8]. Recently, we have also pro-
vided GSN with formal foundations, in addition to 
tool-based automation support [9]–[12].   
Background 
In this section, we first describe the URS and its 
concept of operations (CONOPS), which will serve 
to exemplify the use of arguments for URS safety and 
airworthiness assurance. Then, in brief, we present 
the core elements of the GSN as well as its modular 
extensions, which we will use subsequently in the 
paper to present the URS preliminary safety case; a 
component of this safety case is URS airworthiness.  
Concept of Operations 
The initial scenario in the CONOPS considers 
daytime operations for applications such as precision 
agriculture, conducted within visual line-of-sight (of 
the operator/visual observer) over areas of low popu-
lation density, but away from other aviation activity. 
Extensions to this scenario include operations near 
other aviation activity, at nighttime, in reduced visi-
bility conditions, and BVLOS. Future concepts ex-
tend these scenarios to other applications including 
pipeline monitoring, airborne surveillance, etc., over 
more populated areas. In general, the operations con-
sist of six phases: mission planning, preflight, takeoff 
and climb, flight (including mission operations), and 
descent and landing. For each of these phases of op-
eration, the flight crew have defined nominal proce-
dures as well as contingency procedures for non-
nominal scenarios, to ensure the continued safety of 
flight and the overall operations. 
System Description 
The URS comprises a rotorcraft, a ground con-
trol station (GCS), a command and control data link, 
and the flight crew. The rotorcraft has a maximum 
takeoff weight of 1000 lb., which includes a maxi-
mum allowed payload of 430 lb., a physical envelope 
of 21 ft. x 13 ft. x 5.5 ft., an endurance range from 
2.4 hours (with maximum payload) to 5 hours (with 
no payload), and a maximum airspeed of 105 knots, 
achieved using a turbine-powered tandem rotor con-
figuration. The GCS provides a number of capabili-
ties, including supporting operations in radio line-of-
sight, health monitoring of the onboard flight-critical 
systems, and enabling the execution of specific 
commands to safely terminate flight upon the detec-
tion of anomalous behavior, onboard system failures, 
and during contingencies. Additionally, auxiliary sys-
tems for operational safety include a lateral and verti-
cal containment system—providing a so-called geo-
fence, i.e., a virtual, three dimensional boundary to 
the intended area of operations—and, potentially, a 
ground-based detect-and-avoid (GBDAA) system to 
support BVLOS, nighttime and reduced visibility 
operations. Based on the CONOPS and the rotorcraft 
characteristics, the URS warrants a determination of 
airworthiness, since operations over any populated 
areas pose an appreciable safety risk in the presence 
of in-flight failures. 
Safety Cases and Structured Arguments 
An argument is a connected series of proposi-
tions used in support of the truth of an overall propo-
sition. We usually refer to the latter as a claim, 
whereas the former represents a chain of reasoning 
connecting the claim and the evidence. Applied to the 
domain of safety assurance, a safety argument com-
prises i) explicit safety claims, ii) a chain of reason-
ing that develops those claims, and iii) items of evi-
dence to demonstrate the claims made. Moreover, a 
safety argument can typically contain the ways in 
which the stated safety goals will be developed and 
substantiated, the relevant context and assumptions, 
along with the justifications for their use. A safety 
case can now be thought of as a structured argument 
that assimilates the body of evidence and the reason-
ing required to conclude that a system will be safe for 
a defined application and operating environment. In-
deed, argument-based safety cases are intended to be 
explicit about safety goals, evidence and the underly-
ing reasoning. In addition to arguments, safety cases 
are (and should be) accompanied with a safety man-
agement plan for updating the safety case and keep-
ing it consistent with the system as actually operated.  
Goal Structuring Notation 
Core Notation 
We present the elements of a safety case as an 
argument structure, i.e., a diagrammatic presentation 
of the underlying argument using the goal structuring 
notation (GSN). GSN provides a graphical syntax of 
nodes and links to represent the main elements of an 
argument; together they represent a chain of reason-
ing from premises to conclusions.  
 
(a) Core (non-modular) GSN 
 
(b) Intra-module GSN 
 
(c) Inter-module GSN 
Figure 1. Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) 
The core GSN (Figure 1a) comprises six types 
of nodes: goals contain the safety claims/objectives 
to be shown; strategies specify how claims will be 
refined into lower-level sub-claims; contexts supply a 
basis to interpret goals and strategies, and/or under 
which they are valid; assumptions state (intentional-
ly) unsubstantiated assertions related to the stated 
claims, and the strategies used; justifications supply 
the rationale used for specifying a claim, or using a 
strategy, while solutions represent the evidence items 
being used to substantiate the claims made.  
! !
 
Figure 2. Methodology for Argument-based Assurance 
We indicate incompleteness using the ‘¯’ node 
annotation (read as ‘undeveloped’). Core GSN also 
provides two types of links, which represent specific 
semantic relationships between the nodes, namely a 
support relationship (shown as the filled arrowhead 
link, meaning ‘is supported by’) and a contextual re-
lationship (shown as the hollow arrowhead link, 
meaning ‘in context of’).  
In general, nodes refer to external items includ-
ing a) artifacts such as hazard logs, requirements 
documents, design documents, various relevant mod-
els of the system, etc.; b) the results of engineering 
activities, e.g., safety, system, and software analyses, 
various inspections, reviews, simulations, and verifi-
cation activities including different kinds of system, 
subsystem, and component-level testing, formal veri-
fication, etc.; and c) records from ongoing operations, 
as well as prior operations, if applicable. Nodes also 
contain metadata drawn from domain ontologies that 
provide supplementary and relevant domain-specific 
semantic information.   
Modular Extensions to GSN 
GSN provides two notational extensions for 
modularity: an intra-module notation (Figure 1b) to 
reference external argument elements in other mod-
ules, and an inter-module notation (Figure 1c) to give 
an abstract view of the links between modules. Links 
in modular GSN retain the same semantics as in non-
modular arguments, although there are some excep-
tions to their allowed source/target nodes.  
In brief, we use intra-module GSN within a  
module to reference other modules, (using module 
reference nodes), and specific argument elements in 
other modules (using so-called away nodes). Thus, an 
away goal (context/solution) in a module essentially 
repeats a public goal (context/evidence item) present 
in another module, e.g., public goal node G1 in Fig-
ure 1b. Thus, other modules can reference a public 
node of a given type using the corresponding type of 
away node. Each away node also has a reference to 
the module containing the original content, e.g., in 
Figure 1b, the away goal AG1 refers to the module 
‘Module 1’. GSN also provides a concept of contract 
module, which contains a definition and/or justifica-
tion of the relationship between two or more mod-
ules, in particular how a claim in one (or more) mod-
ule(s) support(s) the argument in the other(s). When 
the argument is supported in an, as yet, unspecified 
module but the contract of support is available in a 
contract module, the reference to that contract is 
shown using a contract module reference node (see 
the node MC1 in Figure 1b). When the contract itself 
is unspecified, an annotation meaning ‘to be support-
ed by contract’ is used (e.g., see goal node G2 in 
Figure 1b), which is mutually exclusive with the an-
notation for incompleteness. The use of inter-module 
GSN effectively specifies a module view that is in-
tended to show how modules are interrelated. For 
more details on modular/non-modular GSN and its 
semantics, see [8], [10]–[12]. 
Methodology 
Figure 2 shows our methodology for creating an 
(airworthiness and safety) assurance argument for the 
URS, considering the extended scenarios in its in-
tended  CONOPS. Broadly, our methodology com-
prises the activities of i) safety analysis, ii) defining 
an abstract safety architecture, followed by iii) trans-
formation of the overall safety reasoning into struc-
tured (modular) GSN arguments. We describe each 
of these activities next. 
(A)  Operational Hazard Analysis (OpHA) &   
      Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) 
       (Safety Analysis) 
•  Hazard Identification (HazID) 
•  Risk Analysis 
!  Risk Assessment 
Hazardous 
Activity 
TE-2 
TE-3 
TE-k 
Consequence 1 
Consequence 2 
Consequence j 
Accident trajectory 
Control 1!
Control m!
Preventative / Avoidance 
Barriers!
Control 2!
Control q!
Mitigation / Recovery / Containment  
Barriers!
TE-1 
(B) Bow-tie Model  
(Abstract Safety Architecture) 
Top 
Event 
(C) Encoding Safety Reasoning 
(GSN Argument Structure) 
G1
Safety of operations
C1
CONOPS
C2
URS
S1
Argument
of hazard
mitigation
G2
All identified hazards
acceptably mitigated 
C3
Characterization
of acceptable
mitigation
C4
OpHA
S2
Argument
over
operation
al phases
S3
Argument
over each
hazard
individually
G4
Mitigation of airspace
encounter with GA
aircraft penetrating
containment boundary 
A
A1
HazID complete and
correct
M1
Mitigation of Flight-
phase hazards
•  Concept of Operations 
•  URS functions 
•  Operator functions 
Operational Hazards 
•  Hazardous activities  
•  Top Events 
Functional Hazards 
•  Threat events 
Hazard Controls 
Safety Requirements 
Transformation 
Transformation 
Mapping 
Table 1. Excerpt from OpHA Hazard Log for the URS 
 
Table 2. Excerpt from FHA Hazard Log for the URS  
 
Safety Analysis 
The safety analysis activity (Figure 2, box A) is 
conducted first as part of an operational hazard as-
sessment (OpHA), followed by a functional hazard 
analysis (FHA). Essentially, this activity consists of 
hazard identification (HazID), risk analysis, and risk 
assessment. Tables 1 and 2 show excerpts of the haz-
ard logs produced from the OpHA and FHA, respec-
tively, based on the CONOPS. Table 1 provides 
traceability to the relevant items of the CONOPS, 
while Table 2 identifies the relevant operational 
phases, and URS and operator functions. We have 
adapted the format of Table 1 and Table 2 from the 
guidance in [13], to include terminology from [14]. 
Hazard Identification 
In a HazID, we examine different elements of 
the CONOPS—in particular, the various assumptions 
and stakeholder needs, the airspace environment, the 
scope and characteristics of the required system, and 
the various phases of operations—to identify hazards, 
i.e., activities, conditions, circumstances, and entities 
with the potential for causing damage (to equipment, 
structures, and property) or harm (to humans). During 
OpHA we identify operational hazards—i.e., hazards 
Activity Top-Event
E1.1.1. Near midair 
collision (NMAC) 2C (High) 2E (Low)
E1.1.2. Midair collision 
(MAC) 1C (High) 1E (Medium)
E2.1.1. Containment 
boundary breach 2B (High) 2E (Low)
E2.2.2. Energetic 
uncontrolled descent 2C (High) 2E (Low)
E2.2.3. Collision into 
potentially populated 
terrain
1C (High) 1E (Medium)
E3.1.1. High-energy 
uncontrolled descent 
with collision into terrain
3C (Medium) 3E (Low)
E3.1.2. Fuel detonation 
with energetic departure 
of parts and chemicals
2C (High) 2E (Low)
P1. Airworthiness 
R1. Automated flight termination
R2. Autorotation 
R4. Crashworthiness 
OH3.1.TE. Loss of 
control on take off 
OH3.1.A. Day time 
operations at lower 
altitudes (up to 20 ft.) 
near sparsely 
populated areas
Section 3.1 
(3) , 3.1 (9), 
3.4.1.3
P1. Airworthiness 
P2. Geofencing
R1. Containment system 
R2. Automated flight termination
R3. Autorotation
R4. Crashworthiness
Sections 3.1 
(3), 3.1 (18), 
3.4.3
Sections 3.1 
(3), 3.1 (7), 
3.1 (12), 
3.1 (13), 
3.3.1
OH2.1.A. Day time 
operations at higher 
altitudes (up to 400 
ft.) near sparsely 
populated areas
OH2.1.TE. Loss of 
control near 
containment boundary 
with deviation from 
flight path
Initial 
Risk Level
Hazard Controls
(P: Proactive, R: Reactive)
Residual 
Risk Level
OH1.1.TE. Airspace 
encounter with GA 
aircraft that will 
imminently penetrate 
containment boundary
OH1.1.A. Night time 
operations at higher 
altitudes (up to 400 
ft.) 
P1. NOTAMs 
P2. Detect and Avoid
P3. Airworthiness 
P4. Aircraft identification lights
P5. Anticollision lighting
Operational HazardCONOPS 
Trace Effects
Functional Hazard
Threat-Event
E1.1.1. Complete 
loss of safety 
margin
1C (High) 1E (Medium)
E1.1.2. Loss of 
separation 2C (High) 2E (Low)
E2.1.1. Slight or 
significant loss of 
safety margin
3C (Medium) 3E (Low)
E2.1.2. Loss of 
control leading to 
energetic and 
uncontrolled 
descent
3C (Medium) 3E (Low)
27.691 - If autorotation capability is 
implemented, each main rotor blade 
pitch control mechanism must allow 
rapid entry into autorotation after power 
failure (TC) 
- Establish controllability and 
maneuverability design margins that 
prevent contact of the vehicle rotors with 
the ground, other parts of ... (TC)
Provide a means to detect and avoid 
other aircraft that may intrude on the 
containment volume and pose a threat to 
loss of separation (TC)
- Means of detecting other aircraft will 
(a) be able to detect airborne vehicles at 
a sufficient range from the containment 
area ... (TC)
URS / 
Operator 
Function
Initial 
Risk Level
Residual 
Risk Level
Flight 
Phase Effects
Safety Requirement (TC: Type 
Certification, OP: Operational 
Procedure)
Takeoff, 
Flight, 
Landing
U4.1.1.1, 
U4.1.1.2, 
U4.1.1.3
FH2.1. Failure to control, 
or inadequate control of 
flight path
FH1.1. Failure to detect, 
alert/warn and avoid 
intruder aircraft
U1.1, 
U1.1.1, 
U1.1.2, 
U1.1.3, 
U1.1.4, 
U1.1.5, 
U1.1.6, 
U1.1.7, 
U1.1.8, 
U1.2
Takeoff, 
Flight, 
Landing
encountered as part of an intended (and inherently 
hazardous) activity—which can be characterized us-
ing so-called top-events, the undesired system state 
when control over the hazardous activity has been 
compromised. For instance, a ‘loss of control near 
the containment boundary, with a deviation from the 
flight path’ is a top-event (Table 1, OH2.1) that, to-
gether with the activity of operating at a higher alti-
tude near a (sparsely) populated area, represents an 
operational hazard. In an FHA, we identify functional 
hazards, i.e., deviations such as functional failures in 
both URS and operator functions. Functional hazards 
can be considered as a subset of the set of threat 
events, i.e., the initiating events of a causal chain 
where the system migrates from a safe state to an un-
desired state (the top-event) and eventually to an ac-
cident state. For example, a failure in the flight path 
control function (Table 2, FH2.1) can contribute to an 
energetic and uncontrolled descent, which can be 
hazardous especially if the failure occurs near the 
containment boundary for operations, i.e., the top-
event mentioned earlier (Table 1, OH2.1). Note that 
although functional hazards are threat events, not all 
threat events need be functional hazards.  
Risk Analysis and Assessment  
The next steps in safety risk management, after 
HazID, are risk analysis, and risk assessment. The 
activities are identical for both OpHA and FHA, 
though the results produced have differing scope.  
The goal of safety risk analysis is to gauge the 
initial level of risk posed by the identified hazards, 
which can be characterized through a combination of 
worst-case consequence severity and occurrence like-
lihood. The goal of safety risk assessment is to define 
the levels of acceptable risk. We use a risk assess-
ment matrix [13] to gauge whether or not the risk 
level posed by the identified hazards are acceptable. 
A key component of these steps is defining UAS haz-
ard severity categories and consequences, which are 
different from those for manned aircraft. For exam-
ple, hull loss, which is traditionally a catastrophic 
consequence may not be catastrophic in the event of 
UAS collision into unpopulated terrain. On the other 
hand, the operational hazard OH2.1, identified earlier 
(Table 1), poses unacceptable risk; the rationale is 
that a potential worst-case consequence—an energet-
ic uncontrolled descent with eventual collision into a 
populated area—has a catastrophic severity. Likewise 
the functional hazard FH2.1 (Table 2) also poses un-
acceptable risk although its risk level is lower than 
that of the operational hazard to which it contributes.  
For hazards with an unacceptable level of risk, 
we first identify a number of hazard controls, follow-
ing which we re-evaluate risk to determine whether 
the hazards can be accepted on the basis of the com-
ponent of risk that remains in the presence of those 
hazard controls, i.e., the residual risk. Hazard con-
trols can be proactive—i.e., they prevent the progres-
sion of the system state to the top-event, and thereby 
avoid the hazard—or they can be reactive, i.e., they 
mitigate, or recover from, the top-event, or contain 
the effects. Thus, for the operational hazard OH2.1 
(Table 1), we have (abstractly) specified a combina-
tion of hazard controls that are proactive, e.g., 
geofencing, as well as reactive, e.g., autorotation, and 
automated flight termination. For a given hazard con-
trol, the risk assessment matrix gives a quantitative 
probability target for design assurance so that the re-
sidual risk is acceptable. Amongst the results of safe-
ty analysis are safety requirements, the implementa-
tion of which realize the identified hazard controls. 
Some of the hazard controls identified through the 
OpHA are functions that can be allocated, in part, to 
the URS. Those functions subsequently undergo 
FHA, and we derive additional safety requirements. 
For the URS operations considered here, the safety 
requirements were categorized as relevant to the type 
design (if the identified hazard controls were applica-
ble to the URS platform); relevant to the operating 
procedures (if the hazard controls would be imple-
mented through restrictions and constraints on opera-
tions); or relevant to both, otherwise. The require-
ments on type design, in fact, are the requirements 
that make up the (type) certification basis (TCB) for 
the URS. In other words, the TCB can be considered 
as one component that contributes to overall safety, 
in particular through its contribution to type design 
assurance as an element of airworthiness.  
Although not shown in Figure 2, we conduct the 
safety analysis activities iteratively until all identified 
hazards have been either accepted, controlled, or re-
jected. Additionally, note that some requirements 
derived from the safety analysis can be mapped to 
existing requirements from the FARs. Reconciling 
the safety requirements with the existing regulations 
is an additional, auxiliary, step in our methodology 
(though not explicitly identified in Figure 2). The 
next step is to define an abstract safety architecture. 
 
Figure 3. Fragment of Bow-Tie Model for the URS 
Abstract Safety Architecture 
The collection and combinations of hazard con-
trols, i.e., barriers, can be thought of as specifying an 
abstract safety architecture. Bow-tie (known also as 
barrier-bow-tie) models (BTMs) visually depict this 
safety architecture, and have been applied for risk 
visualization, operational risk management, and for 
the safety assurance of aviation systems, including 
UASs [14].  
As shown in Figure 2 (box B), the key elements 
of a BTM are (operational) hazards, top-events, 
threat events, consequences, and barriers. There is an 
additional notion of escalation factors, and the asso-
ciated controls, i.e., a second level of barriers con-
cerning the effectiveness and degradation of the pri-
mary barriers, although we do not consider those 
here. Earlier in this paper, we described the first three 
elements. Consequences represent the different acci-
dent states to be avoided, whereas barriers are a com-
bination of hazard controls. There is also a concept of 
accident trajectory, which is a chain of causal events 
beginning with an initiating threat-event that causes 
the system to migrate from a safe state to an unde-
sired system state (i.e., the top-event), and eventually 
to an accident state (a consequence event) through 
breaches of the hazard control barriers.  
Each top-event can be caused by multiple threat 
events and, in turn, lead to multiple consequences. 
Moreover, each hazardous activity can be associated 
with multiple top-events (not shown). Depending on 
the role of the barriers, i.e., for prevention/avoidance 
or recovery/mitigation, they appear earlier (on the left 
of the BTM) or later (on the right of the BTM) in the 
causal chain. The identified hazard controls can work 
together or separately as barriers to multiple threat-
events or different top-events. Consequently, barriers 
cannot be assumed to be independent and the suscep-
tibility of barriers to common mode/cause breaches is 
a concern that should be eventually addressed in the 
safety case.  
To cover the range of hazards encountered dur-
ing operations, we create a BTM for each identified 
operational hazard. Figure 3 gives a fragment of the 
BTM created for an identified hazard to the URS op-
erations (OH2.1, Table 1), and reflects (some of) the 
content of the OpHA and FHA hazard logs (Tables 1 
and 2). As shown, three functional hazards have been 
identified as threat events contributing to the loss of 
rotorcraft control: a failure to control the flight path 
(FH2.1, Table 2), loss of navigation capabilities, and 
a failure to detect/register adverse weather conditions 
(the latter two have not been shown in Table 2). A 
number of other threat events can be given similarly. 
The worst case consequence is a collision into the 
nearby populated terrain, with a number of interme-
diate preceding effects, including a breach of the con-
tainment boundary, and an energetic, uncontrolled 
descent (Table 1). Not all identified hazard controls 
need to be implemented; the choice trades off the cost 
of implementing and certifying the available controls, 
against the overall risk to be managed. As shown 
(Figure 3), hazard controls are a combination of op-
erating procedures (e.g., pre-flight checks and flight 
OH2.1.A. Daytime 
operations at higher 
altitudes (up to 400 
ft.) near sparsely 
populated areas  
OH2.1.
TE 
E2.1.2. Energetic 
uncontrolled descent 
FH2.2. Loss of, or 
inadequate navigation  
Loss of control near 
containment boundary 
with deviation from 
flight path 
E2.1.3. Collision 
into potentially 
populated terrain 
E2.1.1. Containment 
boundary breach 
R2. Automated 
flight termination 
system 
R1. 
Containment 
system 
R3. 
Autorotation 
R4. Crashworthiness 
(Structures, Fuel 
tanks, Fire 
suppression) 
FH2.1. Failure to 
control, or inadequate 
control of flight path 
Pre-flight 
checks Mission 
and flight 
planning 
Crew 
situational 
awareness 
P1. Airworthiness – 
Adequate design of 
controllability and 
maneuverability 
FH3.1 Failure to detect, 
or register adverse 
weather conditions 
Envelope 
protection 
Weather 
aware flight 
planning 
Alter flight path 
(GCS / Autopilot) 
P1. Airworthiness – 
redundant navigation 
systems 
Scheduled 
maintenance 
In-flight 
weather 
monitoring 
P2. 
Geofence 
planning), airworthiness of the rotorcraft (e.g., relat-
ing to the design of control and maneuvering of the 
URS), redundancy in the navigation equipment, and 
additional equipment (e.g., containment systems). 
From the BTM, it is clear that airworthiness is one 
available hazard control mechanism, which may be 
classified as a system reliability barrier [14]. The cor-
responding requirements, in particular those relevant 
for design assurance (i.e., the type design require-
ments) follow from the specific airworthiness-related 
controls that will be chosen for managing safety risk. 
We can further categorize each type design require-
ment based upon the component/function of the URS 
to which it applies, e.g., the control system, struc-
tures, powerplant and propulsion, etc. 
The final step in our methodology will transform 
the reasoning underlying the safety analysis and the 
abstract safety architecture into an argument structure  
that embodies the preliminary safety case. 
Transformation of Safety Reasoning 
The safety case, more specifically the safety ar-
gument (Figure 2, box C), encodes the safety reason-
ing underlying the safety analysis, and the abstract 
safety architecture. Our process for safety argument 
development comprises six key activities, namely: i) 
argument design/assembly, ii) claims definition, iii) 
claims refinement/composition, iv) evidence defini-
tion/selection, v) argument analysis, and vi) argument 
improvement. The specific details of each activity are 
out of scope for this paper (see [15], [16] for more 
details). In brief, our argument development process 
focuses on the data flow between the constituent ac-
tivities, based upon which we can infer an intuitive 
ordering to the activities. In general, however, argu-
ment development can be performed in a top-down, 
or a bottom-up manner. The former requires the defi-
nition of a high-level argument architecture, and the 
relevant (safety) claims, which is followed by a suc-
cessive refinement into the appropriate lower-level 
details. The latter, in contrast, is concerned with the 
assembly of an argument based on the inferences that 
can be drawn from the available evidence.  
Since the safety analysis we have performed 
thus far is, essentially, a concept safety analysis, i.e., 
a safety analysis of the CONOPS of the URS-based 
operations, a top-down approach for argument devel-
opment is appropriate. Moreover, only the activities 
of argument design/assembly, claims definition, and 
claims refinement are relevant. The remaining activi-
ties of the argument development process will be 
triggered in the later stages of system development, 
i.e., when creating a specific URS design and imple-
mentation to meet the requirements of the TCB and, 
in turn, of airworthiness and operational safety. Next, 
we present fragments of the safety argument obtained 
by transforming both the safety reasoning and the 
safety architecture using our process for developing 
assurance arguments. 
Structured Assurance Arguments 
The overall argument connects the top-level 
claim (of acceptable safety in the URS-based opera-
tions) to the identified hazards, the barriers to avoid 
and/or contain those hazards, and eventually to the 
safety requirements corresponding to the underlying 
hazard controls. 
Argument Architecture 
The argument architecture is an abstraction of 
the overall assurance argument. We represent it as a 
tiered organization where each tier contains argument 
fragments addressing a specific assurance concern. 
Note that GSN does not have an explicit notion of (or 
notation for) argument architecture. Consequently, 
our representation (Figure 4) serves only to illustrate 
the idea informally.  
As shown, the argument architecture for the 
URS has eight tiers: the uppermost tier (Tier 0) ad-
dresses the top-level safety claim identified above, 
and develops it into claims related to safety risk man-
agement for the operations detailed in the CONOPS. 
Then, in Tier 1 we address the operational hazards 
and the existing regulations, i.e., the FARs. Manag-
ing the risk associated with the former is among the 
core strategies underlying the safety case for the con-
cept. Tier 2 is concerned with the identified threat 
and consequence events associated with each hazard 
detailed in Tier 1. Each hazard, in turn, can be asso-
ciated with several threat and consequence events.  
The categorization of threat events is the main 
concern of Tier 3. This tier has been introduced to 
map the threat events (identified in the FHA), as well 
as the causes of the top-event (identified in the 
OpHA). Although not shown in Figure 4, based on 
the effects of a top-event, we can define a similar 
tiered structure for the consequence events as a coun-
terpart to Tier 3. 
 
Figure 4. Safety/Airworthiness Argument Architecture 
Tier 4 concerns the different kinds of barriers 
(i.e., proactive, or reactive) that address the threat and 
consequence events of Tier 3. Tier 5 further classifies 
each kind of barrier based on the specific functional 
or non-functional system concern addressed by the 
collection of hazard controls that the barriers repre-
sent. For example, reliability, impact management, 
strategic conflict management, terrain avoidance, 
etc. The specific classification given here has been 
adopted from [14], based on its prior use for UAS 
operational safety assurance. The reliability barrier 
(Figure 4, T5.1.1), is concerned with reducing flight-
critical failure probability.  
As mentioned earlier, hazard controls can con-
tribute to multiple barriers which, in turn, can address 
multiple threat and consequence events. However, 
neither the hazard controls nor the barriers can be 
assumed to be independent For instance, in Figure 3, 
scheduled maintenance is a control for failure haz-
ards and, thereby, an element of the reliability barrier, 
whereas autorotation is a hazard control meant for 
managing engine malfunction and thereby controlling 
rotorcraft descent, in the purview of the impact man-
agement barrier. Inadequate maintenance of the me-
chanical components required for autorotation is a 
common cause for breaching both hazard controls 
and the corresponding barriers, which can transition 
the system state to the top-event. Consequently, an 
additional component of Tier 4 is the reasoning re-
quired to address common mode/cause barrier 
breaches and to determine the requirements on barrier 
independence. Then, in Tier 6, we develop the argu-
ments concerning preventative, and/or containment 
controls to address, respectively, threats and conse-
quences (as identified in Tier 3). It is possible to fur-
ther categorize Tier 6, i.e., the hazard controls, based 
on whether they are related to technology (systems, 
components, equipment), processes, procedures, pol-
icies, etc., though we have not done that here. Tier 7 
aggregates the safety requirements derived from the 
chosen hazard controls. Effectively, this tier contains 
the requirements relevant for the type design, which 
will be included into the TCB. Since the argument 
architecture corresponds to the reasoning underlying 
the abstract safety architecture, the BTM can be con-
sidered as the specification of the system safety case. 
Modular Representation 
Figure 5 presents one possible modular realiza-
tion of the argument architecture of Figure 4—using 
the inter-module GSN—as a module view, i.e., anoth-
er abstract presentation of the underlying assurance 
argument, showing their organization into different 
modules. Note that it is also possible to create a non-
modular argument that realizes the argument archi-
tecture. However, such a structure would be appre-
ciably large and difficult to manage and/or change.  
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Figure 5.  Argument Architecture (Module View) 
As shown (Figure 5), each of the modules M0–
M6 abstracts a tier, or a combination of tiers of the 
argument architecture (Figure 4).  
We have chosen a straightforward modulariza-
tion based, intuitively, on the argument architecture. 
Thus, module M0 contains the arguments addressing 
the concerns of Tier 0 and, in part, Tier 1 (i.e., T0 and 
T1.1, safety risk management and operational haz-
ards), while module M1 also contributes to realizing 
Tier 1 (i.e., T1.2, the existing regulations deemed 
applicable). Then, module M2 addresses threat 
events, therefore covering the concerns of Tiers 2 (in 
part) and 3, (i.e., T2.1, and T3.1–T3.4), whereas 
module M3 addresses consequence events, realizing 
the remaining concern of Tier 2 (i.e., T2.2). As 
shown in Figure 5, the modules M2 and M3 (as well 
as M1), support the argument in module M0 whilst 
also contextually invoking elements of the same. 
Module M4 contains arguments addressing the proac-
tive barriers and the corresponding preventative haz-
ard controls, thus partly addressing Tiers 4, 5, and 6 
(i.e., T4.1, T5.1.1–T5.1.5, and T6.1). Likewise, mod-
ule M5 contains arguments addressing the reactive 
barriers and the corresponding mitigation, recovery, 
or containment hazard controls, thus addressing addi-
tional aspects of Tiers 4, 5 and 6 (i.e., T4.2, T5.2.1– 
T5.2.5, and T6.2). Finally, module M6 addresses the 
remaining concerns of Tier 4 (i.e., T4.3, the common 
mode/cause barrier breaches and barrier independ-
ence). Each of the modules M4 and M5 support the 
modules M2 and M1, and M3 and M1 respectively, 
and require support from module M6.  Additionally, 
the modules M1, and M4–M6, collectively realize 
Tier 7 (T7.1), which contains the requirements on 
safety, airworthiness and type design assurance. 
Argument Contents 
Now, we give fragments of the arguments in 
some of the modules (namely M0, M3, and M5) such 
that, taken together, the fragments form an end-to-
end slice of the complete preliminary safety argument 
(not shown). Thus, the fragments considered connect 
the top-level claim of the safety of URS operations to 
(some of) the identified hazards, the appropriate bar-
riers to avoid/contain those hazards, and eventually to 
the safety requirements associated with the underly-
ing hazard control mechanisms. 
Mitigation of Hazardous Activities 
We address the high-level objective of the safety 
of URS operations (the concerns of Tier 0 and Tier 1) 
in the module M0, i.e., the Main – Operational safety 
risk management argument module (Figure 5).  
Figure 6 shows an argument fragment contained 
within module M0, that realizes Tier 0. Here, the 
main claim (G1) is that the URS operations as given 
in the CONOPS will pose an acceptable level of safe-
ty risk. The clarification of the acceptable level of 
safety, referenced in context (Figure 6, node C5), has 
been intentionally left unstated and informal; the idea 
is that this level of safety is negotiated in dialogue 
with the regulator, which is recorded (e.g., as an FAA 
issue paper), and linked to, through the GSN context 
node. We develop the safety claim in G1 through an 
argument of safety risk management of the hazardous 
activities of the CONOPS, as well as through compli-
ance with the existing applicable regulations (devel-
oped further in the module M1 as indicated by the 
module reference node M1 in Figure 6). In turn, the 
former leads to a number of lower-level claims con-
cerning the residual risk of each identified hazardous 
activity, e.g., as shown by the goal nodes G6, and G7.  
The arguments that develop these sub-goals, rep-
resenting the realization of Tier 1 of the argument 
architecture, are also contained within module M0. 
Figure 7 illustrates one such argument fragment, de-
veloping the claim of goal node G7. Note that this 
claim corresponds to the top-event of the BTM (Fig-
ure 3) which, in turn, traces to the hazardous activity 
OH2.1.A and corresponding top-event OH2.1.TE 
(Table 1), identified during the OpHA. As shown 
(Figure 7), we develop that claim over the associated 
top-event (goal node G8) and subsequently by argu-
ments of prevention of the threat events (Figure 7, 
strategy node S7), or mitigation of the consequence 
events (Figure 7, strategy node S8), respectively.  
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Figure 6.  Argument Fragment in Module M0 (Tier 0) 
We observe that the modular arguments in Fig-
ures 6 and 7 invoke the modules upon which their 
containing module, M0, depends, i.e., the modules 
M1 (Figure 6, module reference node M1), M2 (not 
shown), and M3 (Figure 7, away goal node G14), 
which is consistent with the module view (Figure 5). 
Mitigation of Threat and Consequence Events 
Figure 8 shows a fragment of a modular argu-
ment in the Consequence events mitigation argument 
module, M3. This module implements Tier 2 of the 
argument architecture (in particular T2.2, Figure 4, as 
indicated earlier). Note that the top-level claim in the 
argument (G1) reflects an aggregation of the lower-
level claims that pertain to the mitigation of the indi-
vidual consequence events identified in the BTM 
(Figure 3) and in the hazard logs (Tables 1 and 2).  
 Moreover, these lower-level claims have been 
annotated as public and, therefore, can be invoked by 
other modules as appropriate. Indeed, the public goal 
node G14 (Figure 8) is identical to the leaf away goal 
node G14 (Figure 7) reflecting the support link be-
tween the modules M0 and M3, as specified in the 
module view (Figure 5). Likewise, the leaf away goal 
G10 (Figure 8) invokes a public goal in module M5 
(goal node G10, Figure 9), again consistent with the 
module view. Effectively, the core argument in mod-
ule M3 is the mitigation of the consequence events 
(e.g., E2.1.2, energetic uncontrolled descent) of a 
given top-event (e.g., OH2.1.TE) using the appropri-
ate reactive barriers, e.g., impact management (away 
goal node G10), as depicted on the right side of the 
top-event in the BTM (Figure 3). We reference the 
BTM in context (Figure 8, away context node C8), 
reflecting the contextual link between the modules 
M3 and M0, consistent (again) with the module view.  
Module M2, i.e., the Threat events prevention 
argument module (not shown) contains similar argu-
ments to address claims concerning the prevention of 
threat events, invoking the relevant proactive barri-
ers. Similar to module M3, these claims are public, 
and therefore invoked in the arguments implementing 
the parent tier, i.e., in module M0. However, the dif-
ference in the structure of the argument, in compari-
son to module M3, is the presence of additional sub-
goals that pertain to the categories of threat events 
(See Figure 4, Tier 3, T3.1–T3.4).  
Provision of Proactive and Reactive Barriers 
The modules M2 and M3 are supported by, re-
spectively, the modules M4 (i.e., the proactive barri-
er argument module), and M5 (i.e., the reactive bar-
rier argument module) (Figure 5). Next, we describe 
a fragment of the modular argument in the latter.  
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Figure 7. Another Argument Fragment in Module M0 (Tier 1) 
Figure 9 gives one fragment of the modular ar-
guments contained in module M5, where claims re-
lated to the barriers for mitigating consequence 
events (e.g., public goal node G10, concerning an 
impact management barrier) have been developed, 
first, into sub-claims concerning the constituent haz-
ard controls (e.g., goal node G17, addressing an auto-
rotation capability) and, subsequently, into lower-
level claims reflecting specific safety requirements 
(e.g., public goal node G18, specifying the require-
ment on autorotation allocated to a URS function: 
rotor blade pitch control). Note that the latter refer-
ences a ‘G1-U issue paper’ in context (node C8), 
which is the formal regulatory mechanism to specify 
the requirements of a certification basis.  
In general, the underlying argument in module 
M5 relates to applying specific hazard control mech-
anisms, associated with each identified reactive barri-
er to a top-event, some of which are eventually rele-
vant to airworthiness and type design requirements. 
Similarly, module M4 (not shown) contains argu-
ments about hazard controls associated with the iden-
tified prevention barriers for a top-event which, in 
turn, have a bearing on airworthiness and type design 
assurance. The leaf goals of the arguments in mod-
ules M4 and M5, thus, represent the set of safety and 
airworthiness requirements, a selection of which re-
late to type design assurance and will be included 
into the TCB. Both modules M4 and M5 also invoke 
the barrier independence and common-mode breach 
mitigation argument module, M6 (not shown), which 
contains the additional arguments (and, consequently, 
additional requirements) to assure that the barriers are 
not breached through common mode/cause failures.  
5/28/15, 12:33 PM
Page 1 of 1file:///Users/gpai/@ARC/safetyisourgoal/trunk/papers/dasc2015/work/M0-T1.svg
G7
The residual risk of the
activity [OH2.1.A. Day time
operations at higher
altitudes (up to 400 ft. AGL)
near sparsely populated
areas] is acceptable
A
A3
The assessment of initial risk,
and residual risk after
implementation of the
controls is credible
A
A1
Hazard identification (HazID) has
completely and correctly identified
all operational hazards (top-
events) associated with the
OH2.1.A
S6
Argument
over each
identified
operational
hazard
J
C3
Risk management of hazardous
activities amounts to managing
the operational hazards (top-
events)
G8
The hazard [OH2.1.TE.
Loss of control near
containment boundary
with deviation from flight
path] is acceptably
managed
 
S7
Argument of
prevention of
all associated
threat events
S8
Argument of
mitigation of all
associated
consequence
events
G9
All threat events for the
hazard [OH2.1.TE] have
been acceptably
managed
G10
All consequence events for
the hazard [OH2.1.TE]
have been acceptably
mitigated
J
J4
Mitigation of consequence
events permits recovery of
system state from effects of
the top-event
J
J3
Prevention of threat
events inhibits the
occurrence of the top-
event
C8
Bowtie model
for the hazard 
[OH2.1.TE]
C7
Bow tie model
for the hazard
[OH2.1.TE]
S10
Argument over
each identified
consequence
event
G14
The consequence
[E2.1.2. Energetic
uncontrolled descent]
is acceptably
contained
M3
A
A5
All credible consequence
events for the hazard
[OH2.1.TE] have been
completely and correctly
identified
 
Figure 8. Argument Fragment in Module M3  
(Tier 3) 
The argument fragment as shown in Figure 9, 
mainly contributes towards realizing the Tiers 5, 6 
and 7 of the argument architecture (Figure 4). The 
realization of Tier 4, in particular the various classes 
of reactive barriers, are realized by an argument 
fragment above goal node G10 (not shown), in the 
same manner as the root claim G1 of module M3 
(Figure 8).  
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have presented a methodology 
to create an explicit, and end-to-end, chain of reason-
ing from the claim of acceptable safety of URS oper-
ations to the requirements on safety and airworthi-
ness. To illustrate the application of our methodolo-
gy, we have created fragments of structured assur-
ance arguments presented using the GSN.  
At a high-level, the arguments reconcile i) existing 
FARs, and include ii) a safety analysis (specifically, 
operational and functional hazard analysis), as well 
as iii) an abstract safety architecture (i.e., BTMs). 
The main focus of the methodology has been to trans-
form the reasoning underlying the latter two compo-
nents. At a low-level, the arguments cover an illustra-
tive range of concerns dealt with by specific require-
ments—in particular, those related to design assur-
ance which, in turn, are relevant for type certifica-
tion—derived from the safety analysis.  
 
Figure 9. Argument Fragment in Module M5  
(Tiers 5, 6, and 7) 
One of our motivations in using categories of 
hazard controls in the argument architecture, and 
subsequently creating a modular realization of the 
latter, is to facilitate reuse. We believe that our ap-
proach provides a means for reusing components of 
the analysis as building blocks for certification and 
operational approval. The idea is to be able to (even-
tually) modify those aspects of the argument and/or 
supporting evidence, as required by a specific UAS 
type and operation.  
Although in current practice, there is no explicit 
need for argument-based airworthiness assurance, we 
believe that the approach may prove useful, especial-
ly for UAS. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, new regula-
tions for UAS airworthiness continue to be under de-
velopment. Although the current approach is to tailor 
existing regulations, the risks to be addressed for 
UAS are different from those for manned aircraft, 
and, in many cases, tailoring existing regulations may 
only cover the overlapping aspects of operational 
safety. In other cases, tailoring regulations may be 
prohibitive in terms of operational flexibility. In the 
absence of regulations and MOPS, a safety case 
serves to integrate operational safety assurance and 
airworthiness. Indeed, it has been suggested that safe-
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ty cases may be appropriate for airworthiness assur-
ance of certain types of UAS—e.g., those possessing 
non-standard equipment, or novel designs/safety fea-
tures [17]—and structured arguments are often a core 
component of safety cases. Second, the relationship 
between the various elements of UAS safety, part of 
which is airworthiness, is largely implicit. The use of 
structured arguments, e.g., as we have done in this 
paper, provides a principled way to make the rela-
tionship explicit, providing a common mechanism 
with which to integrate the various safety-related 
concerns, including airworthiness (i.e., type design 
assurance, maintenance, etc.), and operational proce-
dures. Third, an assurance argument serves as an ex-
plicit record of safety rationale. It is worth noting that 
the explicit inclusion of rationale is one advantage of 
an argument-based representation, whereas in current 
practice, rationale is often distributed among different 
documents or left implicit. 
Our current work has primarily considered the 
air-vehicle platform. Moving forward, the scope of 
argumentation could be extended to cover a wider 
range of concerns, for example requirements on the 
GCS, and the command and control link. We antici-
pate that parts of the reasoning would be similar to 
what we have already used, and could be captured in 
the form of safety case patterns [10]. Such patterns 
would serve two roles: i) to communicate the abstract 
reasoning independently of the specific details of a 
particular analysis and, ii) to generate concrete argu-
ments from the safety analysis. Moreover, as de-
scribed in the earlier sections of this paper, the type 
design requirements identified through safety analy-
sis are an element of airworthiness. That, in turn, is a 
component of the safety architecture and, conse-
quently, of the resulting preliminary safety case for 
the concept.  
Since the TCB is, at its core, an aggregation of 
the type design requirements, we believe that it may 
be feasible to extract the TCB from the assurance 
arguments, e.g., using metadata and querying [18], in 
a systematic (and ultimately automated) way. The 
constituent requirements of the TCB would be, effec-
tively, leaves of the argument, and could be thought 
of as a view of the underlying argument. Additional 
views could also be constructed to communicate the 
key concerns and aspects of safety analysis relevant 
for a specific stakeholder, e.g., the civil aviation 
regulator.  
There are justifiable reasons why normative reg-
ulations and MOPS may be preferred for regulating 
UAS instead of safety cases [19]. Nevertheless, our 
idea in this paper has been to use structured argu-
ments within the framework of existing regulations, 
leveraging the existing safety processes which are 
applied in practice. In this paper, we have shown how 
the latter can be transformed into structured argu-
ments, to serve as a central artifact in SRM activities, 
with traces to various other safety artifacts.  
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